Abstract-Performability modeling and evaluation methods are applied to the SIFT computer in the computational environment of an air transport mission. User-visible performance of the "total system" (SIFT plus its environment) is modeled as a random variable taking values in a set of "accomplishment levels." These levels are defined in terms of four attributes of total system behavior: safety, no change in mission profile, no operational penalties, and no economic penalties. The "base model" of the total system is a stochastic process whose states describe the internal structure of SIFT as well as relevant conditions of its environment. Base model state trajectories are related to accomplishment levels via a "capability function" which is formulated in terms of a three-level model hierarchy. Solution methods are then applied to determine the performability of the total system for various choices of computer and environment parameter values.
I. INTRODUCTION
PERFORMABILITY modeling and evaluation methods, as introduced in [1] and [2] , provide a means for quantifying the "ability to perform" when system performance is "degradable," that is, depending on the history of the computer's structure and environment during some specified utilization period T, the system can exhibit one of several worthwhile levels of performance (as viewed by the user throughout T). Of particular interest are systems where degraded levels of performance (in addition to "full degradation" or "failure") are caused, at least in part, by changes in the computer's structure. Typically, such changes are due to faults which occur during utilization and to subsequent structural reconfigurations that are made in the process of fault recovery. Changes in structure may also be due to reconfigurations that are made to accommodate changes in the computer's environment and, particularly, its workload.
If performance is degradable then, as observed in [1] and [2] , traditional views of computer "performance" and computer "reliability" are no longer applicable. These views matured in the context of nondegradable performance where, in the presence of structural changes, a system either performs adequately (success) or does not (failure). In this context, "performance" is regarded as successful performance and "reliability" as the ability to perform successfully (probability Manuscript received August 6, 1979 ; revised January 24, 1980 of success). In particular, we see these views reflected by the analytic models that are typically used for computer performance and reliability evaluation. Probabilistic models for performance evaluation (see [3] - [5] , for example) represent variations in internal state (e.g., the number of jobs being served or waiting for service in each resource) and environment (e.g., job arrivals), but assume that the structure of the system is fixed (time-invariant). On the other hand, probabilistic models for reliability evaluation (beginning with [6] and continuing through the recent work of [7] and [8] ) represent variations in structure (e.g., for each type of resource, the number that remain fault-free) while ignoring the influence of internal state and environment. Although such modeling restrictions are appropriate in the case of nondegradable systems, as argued in [1 ] and [2] , more general models are called for when performance is degradable.
As a consequence of these observations, a general modeling framework was introduced [1] , [2] which permits the definition, formulation, and solution of a unified performance-reliability measure referred to as "performability." We assume the reader is familiar with this framework, which can be summarized as follows. The system being modeled is referred to as the total system, denoted S = (C, E), where C is the computer and E is its environment. (Although we refer to C as the "computer," it should. be generally interpreted as that part of the total system which is the object of the evaluation, that is, the part which lies within the "system boundary"; see [3] and [4] , for example.) As is typically done in probabilistic modeling, the low level (detailed) view of S is modeled as a stochastic process Xs defined over a time period T called the utilization period. The process Xs is referred to as the base model of S. Each random variable Xt (t E T) of the base model Xs takes on values in a state space Q where a given state in Q represents a particular status of both the computer and its environment. More precisely, Q = QC X QE where QC is the state set of the computer and QE is the state set of its environment. Moreover, a state q e QC may describe both the structural configuration of the computer and the internal state of that structure. An instance of the base model's behavior is a state trajectory u:T -Q where u(t) = Xt, the state of S at time t. Finally, the collection of all possible state trajectories is denoted U and is referred to as the trajectory space ofS.
As for the user-oriented view of the total system, we assume that the user is interested in distinguishing a number of different levels of accomplishment when judging how well the system has performed throughout the utilization period T (one such level may be total system failure). The user's "description space" is thus identified with an accomplishment set A whose elements are referred to alternatively as accomplishment levels 0018-9340/80/0600-0501$00.75 © 1980 IEEE 501 or (user-visible) performance levels. Accordingly, the user's view of total system behavior is modeled by a random variable
Ys taking values in the accomplishment set A. Ys is referred to as the performance ofS. In the terminology of computer performance evaluation, Ys can be regarded as any user-oriented performance "measure" or "index" that summarizes the behavior of S throughout the utilization period T.
Given this representation of user-visible performance, a natural measure which quantifies the "ability to perform" is the "probability distribution function" of the performance variable Ys. In case the accomplishment set A is discrete, the "probability distribution" of Ys suffices, that is, the performability ofS is the function.ps defined on A where ps(a) = the probability that S performs at level a. (1) In constructing a model that can support an evaluation of performability, we assume that enough is known about the probabilistic nature of the computer's structure and environment to permit the specification of the base model, i.e., the stochastic process Xs. Once the base model Xs of a total system S is specified, the essential problem in performability modeling is to formulate the capability function ys or, more precisely, its inverse 'y I.
The technique we have used to solve this problem is to elaborate the base model into a model hierarchy, permitting a decomposition of ys into interlevel translations [1] , [2] . After the capability function is formulated, if the accomplishment set is finite, then model solution is basically a two-step procedure. Center by SRI International [9] , [10] . Its [12] , [13] developed by the C. S. Draper Laboratory) and both will eventually be subjected to extensive evaluation. The choice of SIFT for this study was due mainly to early availability of information regarding the allocation of tasks to processor-memory units [9] . These task allocations, particularly in degraded modes of operation, indicate how the structure of SIFT relates to the accomplishment of aircraft functional tasks. Moreover, the attributes used to distinguish the "criticalities" of functional tasks [11] support a natural definition of accomplishment levels for the total system.
Following the terminology and notation summarized in the Introduction, the system in question is the total system S = (C, E) where C is the SIFT computer and E is a transoceanic flight of an advanced commercial aircraft. Assuming that the user is the airline that owns the aircraft, the user's view of desired total system performance can be stated quite simply: "Transport passengers from airport A to a transoceanic airport B, safely, directly, and with minimum operational and economic penalties." Examining this statement in more detail, total system performance can be described in terms of four attributes: safety, no change in mission profile, no operational penalties, and no economic penalties. (See [11] for a more precise interpretation of these attributes, used there to distinguish the "criticalities" of various aircraft functional tasks.)
To determine the accomplishment set A for the performance variable Ys, we assume that safety is the most important attribute, i.e., safe flights have the greatest worth, the remaining attributes being worth successively less in the order they are listed. (These assumptions regarding relative worths conform with the "reliability requirements" specified in [11] for the corresponding criticality levels.) Assuming further that safety is worth considerably more than no change in mission profile, which in turn is worth considerably more than no operational penalties, etc., the following accomplishment set suffices to describe the performance levels of interest to the user: A = lao, a,, a2, a3, a4l (2) where ao = no economic penalties, no operational penalties, no change in mission profile, and no fatalities, a I = economic penalties, no operational penalties, no change in mission profile, and no fatalities, a2 = operational penalties, no change in mission profile, and no fatalities, a3 = change in mission profile and no fatalities, a4 = fatalities. Accordingly, the performance of S (see Section I) is a randomt variable Ys taking values in the accomplishment set A specified above. Since A is discrete, the performability Ps, which we seek to evaluate, is the probability distribution defined in
To construct a base model Xs that can support an evaluation of Ps. the state sets QC of SIFT and QE of its environment must be refined enough so that each state trajectory u:T" QC X QE of the process Xs (see Section I) results in a uniquely determined accomplishment level a E A. In other words, the trajectory space U must admit to the formulation of a capability function -ys:U -A. On examining the architecture of the SIFT computer' whose general organization is depicted in Fig.  1 , we find that it suffices (with one exception to be discussed later) to know the number of processor-memory units and the number of busses which are fault-free. In other words, a state of q E Qc can be expressed as an ordered pair q = (i, j) where i is the number of fault-free processor-memory units and j is the number of fault-free busses. Regarding the environment, we find that the weather condition at the destination airport is an influential variable and, under reasonable assumptions, the only environmental variable that need be considered. (Other environmental factors, such as the duration of the utilization period T, are fixed for a specific total system, and hence are regarded as parameters rather than variables.) Accordingly, the state set of the environment is taken to be the two-element set QE = $0, 1} interpreted as follows: Regarding the utilization period T, we assume that the utilization of SIFT is continuous from departure of the aircraft to arrival at the destination airport. More precisely, taking the departure time to be t = 0, if h is the duration of utilization (in hours), then T is the closed real interval I The architecture presumed here is the version described in [9] which was current at the time the evaluation was conducted. of weather conditions at the destination airport. This should not be confused with how demands on SIFT's resources depend on the weather; the latter type of dependence is "functional" [14] and is determined by the nature of the capability function ,Ys.) Thus, the base model Xs is determined once we specify the probabilistic nature of the stochastic processes Xc and XE.
It is convenient, however, to defer these details to the subsequent discussion of a hierarchical model of S.
In general, to facilitate the description of the capability function, we have proposed the use of a model hierarchy (see [1] and [2] ) which, proceeding from the top down (the "top" model is closely related to the performance variable Ys), consists of a sequence of models describing the total system in successively more detail. The "bottom" model of the hierarchy is comprised of those components of the base model which cannot be introduced directly at higher levels. For the system in question, we find it convenient to introduce three levels of detail (abstraction) and refer to them, respectively, as the "mission level" (level-0), the "aircraft level" (level-1), and the "computer level" (level-2). Following the terminology and notation of [1] and [2] , the model at level-i (0 < i < 2) is a stochastic process Xi defined in terms of a composite process Xc and basic process X,. (The composite process inherits its behavior from the level-(i + 1) model; the basic process does not, i.e., it is a component of the base model process Xs.) The trajectory spaces of X' and Xb are denoted U' and U', respectively, and trajectories in U' ® U' determine trajectories in U7'-(i > 1) via an interlevel translation Ki. (When i = 0, Ko is a function from level-0 trajectories into the accomplishment set A.)
This notation is summarized in Fig. 2 which depicts the model hierarchy for S and its relation to the performance variable Ys. (It is helpful to compare Fig. 2 with Fig. 1 (b) in [1] and [2] where the latter depicts the general form of a model hierarchy.) The specific nature of the hierarchy in question is described in the subsections that follow. since task allocation priorities in the SIFT computer (see [9] ) are weather-independent. Note, however, that this does rule out "demand" dependencies of the type referred to earlier, e.g., computations required for an automatic landing are not demanded during clear weather. Such dependencies are captured by the translation of level-I trajectories into level-0 trajectories, which will be discussed momentarily.
The aircraft functional tasks considered are a representative subset2-of those identified in [11 ] and subsequently added to and modified in [9] . More specifically, we make the following assumptions regarding the aircraft where the functional tasks considered (a total of eight) are signified by capital letter names or acronyms.
1) The aircraft has an Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS) which continuously executes in-flight analyses of various on-board data. Loss of AIDS results in economic penalties.
2) The aircraft has two means of navigation. The first is an inertial guidance system (INERTIAL), while the second involves an air data system (AIR DATA) along with two radio beacon systems: Very-High Frequency Omnirange (VOR) and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). (Support of VOR and DME is regarded as a single functional task denoted VOR/DME.)
3) If the aircraft loses its inertial system before entering a region where it cannot receive VOR/DME signals (e.g., an oceanic region on a transoceanic mission), it will return to its origin. If the aircraft loses its inertial system while out of range of VOR/DME, then the plane loses its navigational capability. Likewise, loss of INERTIAL along with VOR/DME or AIR DATA results in a loss of navigational capability. These losses are assumed to cause a change in mission profile. 4) Loss of VOR/DME or AIR DATA tasks results in operational penalties.
5) The aircraft has an autoland system (AUTOLAND) which, if operational, will land the plane in any weather. The AUTOLAND system requires INERTIAL computations as well as AUTOLAND computations. If, just prior to initiation of landing, the destination airport has Category III weather and the aircraft does not possess the AUTOLAND capability, then a diversion is made to another airport, necessitating a change in mission profile. 6 ) If, just prior to the initiation of landing, the airport has Category III weather, and the aircraft has the AUTOLAND capability, then AUTOLAND is used. Loss of AUTOLAND during landing will cause the plane to crash, resulting in an unsafe mission.
7) The aircraft has active flutter control (ACTIVE FLUTTER CONTROL), attitude control (ATTITUDE CONTROL), and engine control (ENGINE CONTROL) functions, all of which are critical to the airworthiness of the plane. Loss of any one of these functions results in an unsafe mission.
Given Cruise until VOR/DME in range again 3: Cruise until landing is to be initiated 4: Landing. It should be emphasized that, at this level, we are modeling "supply" as opposed to "demand," i.e., SIFT's ability to support a given task during a given phase, independent of whether the task is demanded by the aircraft. Accordingly, the trajectory space Ul of the composite process Xl can be conveniently represented by the set of all instead of tabulating all the trajectories in this preimage (which is a subset of U'), it is expressed as a disjoint union of "Cartesian" subsets of Ul. (Since trajectories in Ul are represented by matrices (6), a Cartesian subset V of Ul can be regarded as a 9 X 4 matrix whose entries are the component sets of the Cartesian product V.) This representation thus parallels the use of "subcubes" to represent switching functions (see [17] , for example) although, in general, we allow the coordinate values to be elements of an arbitrary finite set (the state set of the level-i model). spectively. The complete specification of K1, along with a more detailed discussion of its derivation, can be found in [16] . Computer Level The model Xb at the bottom of the hierarchy is the computer component of the base model process Xs, i.e., the stochastic process Xc identified earlier in the discussion [see (4) ]. In determining the specific nature of Xc, many of the issues to be resolved are similar to those encountered in reliability modeling (see [6] - [8] , for example) and, in particular, those addressed by SRI in their investigation of reliability models for SIFT (see [9, Section VII]). Since the emphasis here is on needs that are peculiar to performability modeling, our construction of Xc is based on a relatively idealized Markov model of SIFT (referred to in [9] as "Model I") where faults are assumed to be permanent and reconfiguration times are assumed to be instantaneous. On the other hand, to deal with performance issues such as the effect of different computational demands (workloads) during different phases of the flight, the utilization period T is decomposed into eight phases at level-2 (see Table II ). Within a given phase, we take the process Xc to be a time-homogeneous Markov process similar to SRI's Model I. However, we generally permit these intraphase processes to differ from phase to phase where the probabilities of interphase state transitions (which take place at the time of a phase change) are specified by interphase transition matrices (see [18] ). Assuming a maximum of n processors (i.e., processor-memory units) and m buses, the intraphase Markov process assumed for all phases except the takeoff phase is given by the transition graph of Fig. 3 . For the takeoff phase, state pairs (2, j) and (2',j) are identified for all j, in which case the model reduces to SRI's Model I [9, p. 151, Fig. VII-2] . The need for the states (2', j) during phases [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] is to distinguish whether a particular processor is faulty when the number of fault-free processors is reduced from 3 to 2. (The fact that processors do not look alike when only three remain fault-free is a consequence of task allocation constraints which will be discussed momentarily.)
Given the computer levef model Xb = Xc, it remains to specify how trajectories in Ub (variations in the structure of SIFT) translate via K2 into trajectories in U1 (variations in SIFT's ability to accomplish aircraft functional tasks). Such a specification is based primarily on how functional tasks or, more precisely, the computational tasks that support them, are allocated to a given number of fault-free processors. Assuming that each processor has a capacity of 0.16 MIPS (millions of instructions per second) and each memory has 5 kwords of storage (these assumptions are scaled down from those of [9] since we are considering a reduced number of functional tasks), this allocation is determined by an algorithm (see [16] ) similar to one employed in [9] . As a consequence, for each phase of the level-2 model, we are able to specify which functional tasks are lost (cannot be accomplished by SIFT) as a function of the number of fault-free processors. This information is summarized in Table III. The information in Table III , along with the assumption that communication among any number of processors is ensured as long as at least two buses remain fault-free (see [9] ), suffices to determine the interlevel translation K2. Because buses do not play an essential role when at least two remain fault-free, it 506 [16] . Having established all the ingredients of the hierarchy (Fig. 2) , our modeling of S is complete.
III. SOLUTION METHODS AND RESULTS
As outlined in the Introduction, once a performability model has been constructed for a system S, the computation of its performability Ps (provided A is finite) is basically a two-step procedure. The first step relies on a knowledge of the capability function -Ys and, for each accomplishment level a E A, yields an appropriate representation of all the base model state trajectories that result in a, i.e., all trajectories in the set Ua = 7y-'(a). The second step relies on a knowledge of the probabilistic nature of the base model Xs and, for each trajectory set Ua, yields the performability value ps(a).
The problems encountered in carrying out these steps are both interesting and challenging since, in effect, they are generalized versions of problems currently being dealt with in the more specific contexts of performance evaluation and reliability evaluation. Our work to date concerning each of these steps has been carried to the point where models of moderate complexity, such as the one just described in the previous section, can be solved without an undue amount of effort. Certain of the algorithms used, particularly in the second step, have been implemented by programs that reside in a prototype software package called METAPHOR (Michigan Evaluation Aid for PerpHORmability). Other algorithms, which have not yet been programmed, can fortunately be carried out manually, although the effort required is somewhat tedious and laborious.
Since space does not permit discussion of these methods, we can only outline the underlying ideas and poinf, as we did in Section II, to recent technical reports for further information. Regarding the first step, i.e., the determination of the trajectory sets Ua, the algorithm used here is based on the fact that 7y can be formulated in terms of the inverses of the interlevel translations. Thus, for the hierarchy in question (Fig. 2) , 'ys' is computed by first determining Ko I(a) and than applying K1I followed by K2l. An important feature of this algorithm is that it manipulates Cartesian representations of the type illustrated in Section II [see (7) ]. Moreover, the trajectory sets determined at each level of the hierarchy are always expressed as disjoint unions of Cartesian subsets. Details concerning the derivation and application of this algorithm can be found in [16] .
The second step of the solution procedure computes the probability of each base model trajectory set Ua. The algorithm requires that Ua be expressed as a disjoint union of Cartesian components, but this is automatically provided by the output of step 1). The probability of each Cartesian component is then computed using a specially developed algorithm that involves the "intraphase" and "interphase" transition matrices of the base model [ 18] . Summing the probabilities of these components yields the performability value ps(a) and, when this is done for each level a, the computation of Ps terminates.
Applying these algorithms, the performability of SIFT was evaluated for a number of specific instances of the total system model described in Section II. An instance of the model is obtained by fixing the values of the following computer and environment parameters. Computer (SIFT) C I) Hardware resources, that is, the number of processors n and the number of buses m (see Fig. 1 and 3) .
C2) Hardware failure rates, that is, the processor failure rate p and the bus failure rate q (see Fig. 3 ).
C3) Initial state distribution, that is, the probability distribution of the random variable XcO [see (4)]. Table   V. E2) The probability of Category III weather at JFK is taken to be 0.011 (see [19, page 173]).
For the fixed values of Cl, C2, and El indicated above and for choices C3 and El as indicated in Tables IV and V, 14 specific systems were evaluated (denoted SI, S2, , S14). For each system Si, the results of the performability evaluation are tabulated in Table VI where the entry corresponding to system Si and accomplishment level aj is the probability psi (aj).
On examining Table VI , we see that a performability evaluation provides the user with a "spectrum" of numbers which quantifies degradable performance when viewed at the user interface. Although the user's primary concern, in this case, is safety, if the probability ps(a4) of an unsafe flight is acceptably low, the performability at safe levels (levels ao-a3) is also a legitimate concern of the user. Moreover concern, that is, performability should be accounted for by design algorithms (e.g., the allocation and scheduling of computational tasks) and should be evaluated in the process of assessing design alternatives.
Although the results given in Table VI 
